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Animal History as Body History:  
Four Suggestions from a Genealogical  
Perspective 
Pascal Eitler 
English abstract: Pursuing Animal History as Body History, this paper focuses neither on 
animals nor on humans, but rather on bodies and the different societal demands made 
on them. It rejects the simple attribution of a history and an actor- or even subject-status 
to humans and animals per se. Instead, the paper suggests a historical problematization 
of the processes that produce humans or animals as having a history and as being actors 
or even subjects. Against this background, I try to demonstrate the usefulness of distin-
guishing between a praxeological approach in a broad sense on the one hand and a ge-
nealogical perspective in a narrow sense on the other. I thus understand Animal History 
less as an expanded form of Cultural History, but much more as a special form of Social 
History, placing at the center of interest neither the nature/culture dichotomy nor the 
concept of life, but rather the concept of the social.  
Although it would be preemptive to claim that the cultural and social 
sciences are headed towards an “animal turn”, it is nevertheless certain 
that Human-Animal Studies and not least Animal History are receiving 
ever greater attention.1 
It remains relatively difficult to pin down a set of concrete questions 
and empirical methods common to all research that falls under the 
heading of the interdisciplinary, even sometimes transdisciplinary field 
of Human-Animal Studies. In contrast, the study of Animal History 
seems to have settled on a dominant approach. The departure point for 
the study of Animal History was to reconstruct the historically variable 
ways in which human-animal relations were represented. Since then, 
the field has taken up a more praxeological approach: many researchers 
now investigate human-animal relations on the level of very different 
practices, attempting to conceive of animals as actors or even subjects, 
and not simply as the objects or mere vehicles of human perceptions 
and judgments. In this sense, it is not only humans, but also animals – or 
better, other animals – who make history.2  
 
1  Cf. for instance Harriet Ritvo, On the Animal Turn, in: Daedalus 136 (2007), p. 118-122. 
2  In the following I am not concerned with selecting and evaluating individual contribu-
tions to the field of Animal History. Rather, I claim that the four suggestions devel-
oped in this paper could have relevance for very different studies in the field. Thus, it 
seems to make sense to distinguish between a praxeological approach in a broad 
sense on the one hand and a genealogical perspective in a narrow sense on the other. 
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This paper3 seeks to demonstrate to what extend this praxeological 
approach has been inadequately pursued in many studies on Animal 
History, arguing in turn that this has often inhibited researchers from 
being able to adequately historicize human-animal relations. In this 
regard, I would like to make four suggestions on how not only human-
animal relations but humans and animals themselves can be historically 
problematized. I aim to conceive of humans and animals as products 
within an endless process of production rather than taking their status 
as actors or even subjects for granted. In this sense, this paper opts for a 
narrower genealogical perspective as distinguished from a broader 
praxeological approach. I thus not only aim to analyze human-animal 
relations on the level of practices, but rather prefer to place the focus on 
the effects of such practices. With this in mind, I will attempt to 
underscore the significance of Body History for Animal History. And if 
Animal History as Body History is to overcome the traditional 
nature/culture dichotomy, then we should pursue it as a special form of 
Social History rather than as an extended form of Cultural History.4  
1. A Genealogical Perspective on the Question of History 
The interest that the study of Animal History has garnered is often un-
dergirded by the claim that such study will wholly change the way we 
think about history and the way historians pursue their work. From this 
point of view, animals not only make history – they supposedly also 
have a history.  
This claim not only should be made more precise: nobody disputes 
the fact that some animals have made more history than others. The 
claim should also be more differentiated: to make history is not the same 
as to have a history. For example, an earthquake can make history and 
influence humans, but it does not have a history in the same sense that 
humans – at least most – have a history. This is the case not because an 
earthquake is not human, but rather because humans have only little 
capacity to exert any sort of influence on earthquakes. Humans have 
complex encounters with earthquakes, but earthquakes don’t have 
comparable encounters with humans.   
 
3  I would like to thank Bettina Hitzer, Maren Möhring, Joseph Ben Prestel, Monja 
Schottstädt and the anonymous reviewers at Body Politics for their helpful critique 
and Adam Bresnahan for translating this paper from German into English. 
4  In this context, I disregard the lack of interest that most established forms of Social 
History have shown towards Animal History and Body History. 
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From a genealogical perspective, it is in this sense decisive that the 
concept of history not be wholly decoupled from humans. The reason for 
this, however, is not that humans principally differ from animals 
through the characteristic of having a history. But it should be kept in 
mind that history is synonymous neither with time nor the past nor with 
fate nor evolution. The meaning given to the concept of history in the 
last two hundred years – not least by historians – has more and more 
been related to humans or to a historically specific understanding of 
humans, their “origins” and “identity”, their “progress” and “civility”.5 
And this concept itself has not been without its own historical impact. In 
this regard, the field of Postcolonial Studies has rightly emphasized that 
also attributing a history to all humans is not a simple, harmless act be-
cause it frames our relations to other humans and these humans’ world-
views.6 But for precisely this reason this concept of history has a heuris-
tic value – not in spite of its conceptual limits, but because of them, inso-
far it is deeply embedded in power relations and societal hierarchies. It 
reminds us that humans not animals are writing this history. 
My first suggestion is thus that it might be useful to attribute a history 
only to those animals that have had direct encounters and confronta-
tions with humans over a longer period of time and whose modes of ex-
istence have been traceably influenced by humans – that is, in cases 
where humans and animals have formed a society or at least some sort 
of collective.7 In this sense, taking up a genealogical perspective implies 
that we should not a priori attribute supposedly universal human con-
cepts to all other beings, as if there were no other legitimate, acceptable 
modes of existence. Rather, we have to clearly determine the time pe-
riod and social conditions in which certain animals became actors or 
even subjects in their confrontations with humans. Such animals did not 
only make history, but also had a history – a shared history as compan-
ion animals in the broadest sense of the notion.8  
 
5  Cf. for instance the classical studies of Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, New York 
1970; ibid., The Archaeology of Knowledge, London and New York 2002.  
6  See for example Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, New York 1988; Dipesh Chakra-
barty, Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for "Indian" Pasts?, in: 
Representations 37 (1992), p. 1-26. 
7  Animal History as Body History thus takes up a genealogical perspective in the        
Nietzschean sense while turning Nietzsche’s notion against his own use of it, as he 
himself claimed that animals per se cannot have a history. On the centrality of        
Nietzsche for such a perspective on history see Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Geneal-
ogy, History, in: Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, London 1991, p. 76-100. 
8  Cf. also Donna Haraway, When Species Meet, Minneapolis 2008. Donna Haraway 
speaks of a co-history between certain humans and certain animals – in doing so, she 
also binds the concept of history to humans.  
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Thus, in contrast to an earthquake, a cleared or newly forested moun-
tain could have a history, and just as well, lactobacillales could have a 
history after their encounters with Louis Pasteur, dogs have one as pets 
and pigs as meat.9 An animal that has had no such confrontations with 
humans has no history. After all, how is the empirical work of historians 
brought any further by insisting that humans have influenced all ani-
mals on this planet considered as a complex ecological network? In this 
sense, the claim that animals have a history is not a universal answer, 
but rather a heuristic question. Bruno Latour has shown in more ways 
than one that we should not attempt to find a single answer that would 
function for all humans, animals or other beings, but rather that the 
same questions should be posed in each particular case. In this regard, 
he speaks of a “symmetrical anthropology”.10 
Thus, from a genealogical perspective Animal History does not have 
much in common with Environmental History. Within Environmental 
History ‒ nomen est omen ‒ animals are mostly conceived of not as part 
of a society, but rather as part of the environment. I have the impression 
that such a differentiation does not overcome the nature/culture di-
chotomy, but rather supports it. Environmental History very often 
seems to hold on to the unfruitful opposition between environment and 
society or nature and culture, and does not escape this opposition by 
investigating the “interplay” or “interactions” between the opposing 
poles. In this sense, promoting “bridges” only means to reestablish 
“gaps”. Environmental History is thus unable to adequately historicize 
animals and humans and their possible agency.   
2. A Genealogical Perspective on Actors and Subjectivation 
The concept of agency currently prevalent in Animal History is critical 
towards the way in which the cultural and social sciences have long 
viewed consciousness, intentions and language as central criteria for 
distinguishing humans from animals. Drawing especially on the works of 
Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway11, the focus has shifted from con-
sciousness, intentions and language to practices, actors and influences. 
In this sense, the claim is more and more that every animal has the ca-
 
  9  On such encounters, lactobacillales and Louis Pasteur cf. Bruno Latour, Pandora’s 
Hope, Cambridge, MA 1999.  
10  Cf. for instance Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-
Network Theory, Oxford 2005; ibid., We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge, MA 
1993. See also Jakob Tanner, Historische Anthropologie zur Einführung, Hamburg 
2004. 
11  Cf. especially Haraway, When Species Meet. 
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pacity to influence humans and other animals and thus has a specific 
form of agency.12   
From a genealogical perspective we can make a stronger distinction 
between practices and actors. Viewing a bodily movement as a form of 
praxis and not as a muscle twitch itself demands a certain degree of in-
terpretation. However, an ever greater degree of interpretation is im-
plied when one draws an immediate connection between a praxis and 
an actor to whom this praxis is ascribed.13 The idea that certain beings 
are per se actors and thus have agency per se ‒ everywhere and all the 
time ‒ should be tossed out. My second suggestion is that we should 
rather direct more attention to demonstrating that “agency is something 
made”.14 The way in which a certain being has to be made into an actor 
ever anew could be an object of further investigation. In this way, hu-
mans, animals and other beings must not only be viewed as actors, but 
also recognized as actors to a certain degree.15 They must be attributed 
with and possess certain capacities that allow them to carry out prac-
tices conditional for being considered as an actor in a given society. 
Along these lines, humans too must repeatedly reassert their status as 
actors, a status they can also lose to a large degree, as is for instance the 
case with many so-called disabled persons or coma patients. Considered 
as an actor, every being is a product – an effect of practices.  
The differentiation between practices and actors seems to have a con-
siderable heuristic value, especially as the concept of the actor is very 
often easily confused with the concept of the subject.16 Human-Animal 
Studies and Animal History are more and more concerned with catego-
rizing animals as subjects and not as objects. However, categorically af-
firming the status of animals as subjects completely ignores the signifi-
cance of the notion of actors and their agency, which for its part has 
 
12  The concept of agency is significant not only for Human-Animal Studies, but also for 
Postcolonial Studies and Gender Studies, to name just two; however, the concept is 
deployed in many different ways.  
13  On this concept of praxis cf. for example Andreas Reckwitz, Toward a Theory of So-
cial Practices. A Development in Culturalist Theorizing, in: European Journal of Social 
Theory 5 (2002), p. 245- 265. This distinction between actors and practices was also 
emphazised by Friedrich Nietzsche. 
14  Cf. for instance Timothy Mitchell’s account on actor-network theory in response to 
the question: “Can the mosquito speak?” Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, 
Techno-Politics, Modernity, Berkeley 2002, p. 53. 
15  The need of being viewed and recognized as an actor was strongly emphasized by 
Pierre Bourdieu. Cf. for example Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, Cambridge 
2000. 
16  And the concept of the subject is very often easily confused with the concept of the 
individual. From a genealogical perspective, however, neither a subject nor an actor 
should be addressed as an individual. 
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been undergirded by Bruno Latour’s rejection of the ahistorical, quasi 
metaphysical subject/object dichotomy.17 
Just as well, the uncritical affirmation of animals as subjects also ig-
nores – with grave consequences – the extensive research on the history 
of the subject and historically variable forms of subjectivation that has 
been carried out in the wake of the work of Michel Foucault. Being a 
subject in the sense of being a self is thereby uncritically understood as a 
sort of natural, permanent attribute of certain beings, celebrated as 
something possessed by humans and at least some animals per se. This 
ultimately occurs to the detriment of other animals that don’t have the 
“luck” of being addressed as subjects and attributed with subjectivity. A 
genealogical perspective, however, is in no way concerned with simply 
denying subjectivity. The idea of Michel Foucault was to focus on his-
torically specific forms of subjectivation, viewing subjectivity as a diffi-
cult societal task that ultimately can never be completed.18 Instead of 
hypostasizing humans and animals a priori as subjects, we should rather 
historically problematize different processes of subjectivation, both for 
certain humans and maybe for certain animals, too. The ahistorical af-
firmation of supposedly natural forms of subjectivity poses a barrier to 
the adequate historicization of humans, animals and human-animal rela-
tions.  
In this sense, historical research into the production of humans and 
animals as actors or even subjects must not be limited to a simple affir-
mation of human or animal agency. Such research should rather focus 
on how we can understand agency as a social resource that humans and 
animals compete for, rather than as a natural property.19 Human-animal 
relations have always been power relations, which are not limited to the 
fact that humans have usually exerted more power over animals than 
animals on humans. Rather, a genealogical perspective focuses on re-
constructing the hegemony held by humans in their relations with ani-
mals, thus criticizing the sometimes supposed omnipotence of humans 
 
17  Cf. especially Latour, Pandora’s Hope; ibid., Reassembling the Social. See also ibid., 
An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns, Cambridge, 
MA 2013. 
18  Cf. for instance Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, in: Luther H. Martin/Huck 
Gutman/Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault, Amherst 1988, p. 16-49; ibid., Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, New York 1977. Cf. also Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul. The Shaping of the 
Private Self, London 1990; Andreas Reckwitz, Das hybride Subjekt: Eine Theorie der 
Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne, Weilerswist 2006. 
19  Such an inquiry would for example combine – despite their differences – the insights 
of Pierre Bourdieu with those of Judith Butler.  
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in favor of investigating the various ways humans have ever anew estab-
lished dominance.20 
But we shouldn’t simply conceive of animals as victims and humans as 
victimizers. Instead we could inquire in more detail into what kind of 
societal tasks humans developed both for animals as well as for them-
selves in the context of human-animal relations. Humans have often 
been willing to discipline and normalize their bodies and habits in vari-
ous ways in order to have as little as possible in common with animals, 
which has affected, among other things, human diet, sleep patterns, at-
tire, etiquette, hygiene and sexuality. Being a subject in the sense of be-
ing a self not only means that one has the capacity to make a “free” 
choice, but first and foremost that one subjects oneself to the societal 
demands that make it possible to become a subject and to care for such a 
choice. 
Thus, to decenter humans should not mean to center animals, 
whether it takes the shape of conceiving of animals a priori as actors or 
subjects. To critically historicize the actor- or subject-status of humans 
and animals is a necessary aspect of research into the ways in which 
they were produced, and not just the ways in which they were repre-
sented. Animal History will thus not only have to place a focus on prac-
tices, but also on the effects of such practices – last but not least, the ef-
fects they have on the performative constitution of humans as humans 
and other animals as other animals.   
3. A Genealogical Perspective on Bodies and Materialization  
The study of Animal History is not only hindered by the fact that many 
researchers seem to subscribe to an outdated dichotomy of actors and 
subjects on the one hand and effects and products on the other. Many 
researchers in this field also seem to be fixated on a traditional distinc-
tion between representation and production. A genealogical perspective 
is strictly speaking not concerned with considering the production of 
humans and animals alongside inquiries into various forms of their re-
presentation, thereby subsuming, for example, questions of breeding 
and diet under the heading of production. Rather, a genealogical per-
spective also conceives of forms of representation as an aspect of pro-
duction, not only in a descriptive, but also performative sense.21 In this 
context, Human-Animal Studies and Animal History are not the only dis-
 
20  On the concept of hegemony cf. especially Ernesto Laclau/Chantal Mouffe, Hege-
mony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics, London 1985.  
21  For a precise summary cf. for example Hannelore Bublitz, Diskurs, Bielefeld 2003. 
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ciplines still often hemmed by their unfruitful subscription to the na-
ture/culture dichotomy, which precipitates in dichotomies like those 
between body and language or materiality and discourse. Large 
branches of the cultural and social sciences in general are also still 
plagued by this issue.  
In contrast, a genealogical perspective is defined by the claim that 
there is no materiality without discourse, no body without language, or 
at least not in any way that could be historically reconstructed – which 
is the key issue here. Thus, I am not concerned with analyzing the “in-
terplay” and “interactions” between discourse and materiality or lan-
guage and bodies, as if there were bodies in a given society that some-
how wholly escaped being interpreted and classified from their very 
birth on, their development in turn being deeply influenced by such in-
terpretations and classifications. Taking the works of Michel Foucault 
and Judith Butler as a point of departure I want to emphasize that a dis-
course is per definition only then in question if it has effects – material 
effects.22 Setting this emphasis shifts the primary question of historical 
inquiry: the question is then how bodies have been differently shaped 
and changed in their very concrete modes of existence. My third sugges-
tion is thus that, in taking up a genealogical perspective, it might be use-
ful to focus neither on animals and humans nor on actors and subjects, 
but rather on bodies. Such a shift in focus would give Animal History a 
new aim, namely the historical reconstruction of societal demands made 
on various bodies within the sphere of human-animal relations. The ful-
filment of such demands can be viewed as a condition for the considera-
tion of actors or subjects by an other. Thus, I aim to inquire into the 
ways certain humans and certain animals were produced out of certain 
bodies within a given society and for a specific timeframe.  
By focusing on the processes that produce humans and animals as ac-
tors or even subjects, we should take seriously the manifold distinctions 
drawn between humans and animals – and among humans and animals 
themselves – not only concerning the ways they are represented, but 
also concerning the ways they are produced. From this point of view, the 
ways that humans distinguish themselves from animals in most socie-
ties have grave consequences. The “anthropological machine” analyzed 
by Giorgio Agamben thus functions successfully for the most part: it 
really produces humans as being distinct from animals, with all the un-
certainties and shifts implied therein.23   
 
22  Cf. for example Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of Sex, 
New York 1993. 
23  Cf. especially Giorgio Agamben, The Open, Stanford 2003. 
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The attribution of consciousness, intentions and language not only 
describes particular beings in a more or less adequate way. Rather, it 
also modifies the very concrete existence of these beings, opening or 
closing their various possibilities of action and development. Even if it is 
theoretically unconvincing to make consciousness, intentions or lan-
guage the basis for attributing agency per se to a particular being, his-
tory has shown that being attributed with consciousness, intentions or 
language has had great consequences not only for animals in their con-
frontations with humans, but also for the societies in which they exist. 
Thus, a genealogical perspective does not have the aim, for instance, 
of somehow weakening the role language plays in the work of histori-
ans.24 Rather, with regards to language, it might shift the focus of re-
search to the ways in which some humans have repeatedly attempted to 
make animals speak, how they attempted to better understand the at-
tributed or real speech of animals, and how they attempted to teach 
animals how to better understand humans. In this context, objects of ob-
servation might be the societal demands made of certain animals, the 
ways in which some animals actually learned to successfully fulfill such 
demands or complete certain tasks, and how this influenced these ani-
mals’ mode of existence.  
In this sense, placing the production of animals and humans at the 
center of debate means much more than analyzing forms of breeding or 
feeding. Animals and humans do not only have bodies, but they actually 
are bodies, and these bodies are constantly being subordinated to vari-
ous societal tasks. Emphasizing the breeding and feeding of animals 
does not historically problematize bodies, but rather essentializes them. 
Speaking of an embodied agency that supposedly differs between hu-
mans and animals or stressing the bodily presence of animals more than 
that of humans reinscribes the nature/culture dichotomy that seems to 
always find its way back into Animal History.    
Thus, one should stop drawing a stark demarcation between language 
and body or discourse and materiality only in order to “dialectically” 
transcend it. A better point of departure could be to simply abandon the 
demarcation altogether. We would then be able to consequently analyze 
discourses as practices, describing them in their effects. This would al-
low us to historically investigate materiality in its ongoing materializa-
tion. The common concept of materiality foregrounds the supposedly 
inherent stability of beings, which is, however, only a relative stability 
because every materialization is temporally limited.25 In this sense, the 
 
24  The role of language is often played down in current studies on Animal History. 
25  On this conception of materialization cf. Butler, Bodies that Matter. See also Karen 
Barad, Posthumanist Performativity. Toward an Understanding of How Matter 
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common concept of materiality has a performative rather than descrip-
tive function: it frames relations that humans have with themselves, 
with other humans, with animals or with other beings, insofar as it 
claims to only describe them in their supposedly natural stability. But in 
fact, it attributes humans, animals or other beings with an always al-
ready threatened stability conditioned by various social factors.26 As 
such, the concept of materialization promoted here has the aim of con-
ceiving of bodies in their performativity, and not so much of pinning 
down the performances of bodies.27 I thus understand bodies as a kind 
of surface in its ongoing materialization and not as a kind of container in 
its seemingly ahistorical stability.28 
In this way, Giorgio Agamben, for instance, does not, as it is often as-
sumed, analyze representations of humans and animals in order to show 
how they include or exclude “the” Animal or “the” Human. Rather, he 
deduces the ways humans and animals are produced from ways in 
which the “Animal” and the “Human” are invented and distinguished 
from one another.29 That there is in this sense no materiality without 
discourse has been pointed out in fruitful ways especially in the field of 
Gender Studies.30  
The debate at hand is not concerned with arguing about whether or 
not there is, will be or ever has been a world independent from humans, 
a world that many humans attempt to grasp with the concept of nature. 
Rather, a genealogical perspective argues that historians – on the basis 
of historical sources – can in no way be certain where this world is to be 
encountered or to what extent the existence of all humans and of certain 
animals are no longer or less societally influenced, also as regards their 
bodies: from body weight to bone thickness, from blood pressure to 
strength of sight, from sleep rhythms to allergic shock, from smartphone 
 
Comes to Matter, in: Signs. Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28 (2003), p. 
801-831.  
26  In this paper I am less concerned with grappling with the various forms of New Ma-
terialism or Posthumanism currently discussed in the cultural and social sciences. 
While a genealogical perspective attempts to reconstruct the concrete effects of un-
stable materializations, it seems to me that discussions on New Materialism and 
Posthumanism are more concerned with understanding the principle failure of stable 
materializations.  
27  While the concept of performance grasps the various practices of a body, which is 
thereby very often taken a priori as a given, the concept of performativity focuses on 
the effects of practices that constantly bring forth such a body in its materiality. Cf. 
Butler, Bodies that Matter. 
28  On this kind of surface cf. Foucault, Nietzsche, p. 83. 
29  Cf. Agamben, The Open. 
30  Cf. especially Butler, Bodies that Matter. See also Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the 
Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, New York 2000. 
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thumb to jogger’s knee, from face peeling to hair length. The bodies his-
torians deal with are in their very concrete existence – which is the key 
issue here – always a product of the society and the social conditions in 
which they exist.  
That does not mean that there are no other conditions than social 
conditions and that the nature/culture dichotomy should be thrown out 
because it is principally false and because there is simply no nature that 
is completely separated from culture – a meanwhile all too well-
established criticism made not only by researchers in the field of Animal 
History. Rather, we should reject this dichotomy because it is unfruitful 
for investigating the shared history of humans and animals: it sup-
presses more questions than it poses. Whether or not it is principally 
false cannot be adequately addressed by historians, but it is certain that 
historians do not need such dichotomies for their empirical work.31 
4. A Genealogical Perspective on the Concept of Life 
Such dichotomies of body and language or materiality and discourse 
don’t get any more convincing or useful when one adorns them with 
“dialectical” gowns. So long as the study of Animal History continues to 
directly or indirectly subscribe to such dichotomies, it will be unable to 
adequately historicize humans and animals. Researchers in this field all 
too often hold onto a “remainder” or “core”. This “remainder” or “core” 
is not historically problematized, but rather – in the guise of body or ma-
teriality – essentialized, whether it be in questions regarding the actor- 
and subject-status or whether it be when dealing with supposedly natu-
ral needs and wishes, which are often only depicted as being “manipu-
lable” or “damageable”. Such an essentialization is often made especially 
when discussing the possible “feelings” of humans and animals.  
It is within this context that the concept of life is often foregrounded. 
But the concept of life is an “empty signifier”, which only seems to natu-
rally link together humans and animals, or humans as animals with 
other animals.32 Pursuing Animal History as Body History is not the 
same as foregrounding the concept of life. We should certainly not treat 
all beings as bodies, but if bodies are understood as a kind of surface in 
its ongoing materialization, they don’t necessarily have to be alive in a 
 
31  Thus, from the perspective of Animal History I do not think that the concept of co-
history needs a supplementary concept of co-evolution. For a differing position, see 
for instance Haraway, When Species Meet.   
32  On the concept of the “empty signifier” cf. especially Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation 
(s), London 1996.  
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biological sense. They only have to be attributed with the “quality” of 
being or having been alive or quasi alive. Thus, from a genealogical per-
spective one can see that the appeal to the concept of life is not a simple, 
harmless act and is insufficient in at least two ways. Like the concept of 
the subject, the notion runs against attempts to conceive not only of hu-
mans or animals, but all kinds of other beings as possible actors, ani-
mate or not, an attempt rigorously pursued not only by Bruno Latour. It 
thus hinders the development of a more complex, more concrete under-
standing of societies and social conditions. The use of the concept of life 
within Animal History demands that one explain the criteria that allows 
one to exclude not only things, but also plants from a supposedly “sym-
metrical anthropology”. It also demands that one explain in what way 
such an exclusion is fruitful. In my opinion, we should not attempt to es-
tablish Animal History at the expense of the history of things and the 
history of plants.  
Taking recourse to the concept of life and deducing the actor- or sub-
ject-status of a particular being from it also forces one to explain the ex-
tent to which, for instance, braindead persons or people with artificial 
lungs are actors or subjects, or the extent to which they are living. That 
is, using the concept of life forces one to clarify where life supposedly 
begins and where it supposedly ends. From a genealogical perspective, 
the concept of life is thus not only heuristically questionable, insofar as 
it forces one to research things and plants with approaches entirely dis-
tinct from those used for studying humans or other animals. It is also 
politically questionable, insofar as it potentially delegitimizes the con-
crete existence of various humans – certainly without intention – in fa-
vor of other humans or animals.33  Historians above all should not play 
down this risk.   
My fourth suggestion is thus that the concept of life should not serve 
as the point of departure for the study of Animal History. Rather, the 
point of departure could be the concept of the social. Humans and ani-
mals have a shared history only insofar as they stand in relation to one 
another, only insofar as they are confronted with each other, only inso-
far as they form a society or at least some sort of collective. And they 
 
33  This problem is addressed by the concept of bio-politics as developed in the works of 
Michel Foucault or Giorgio Agamben. Cf. for example Nikolas Rose, The Politics of 
Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton 
2006; Thomas Lemke, Biopolitik zur Einführung, Hamburg 2007; Anna Kirkland/    
Jonathan Metzl (eds.), Against Health: How Health Became the New Morality, New 
York 2010. 
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share this history with all other beings with whom they are confronted, 
be they plants, things or whatever else.34 
Placing the concept of the social at the center of debate and thus pur-
suing Animal History not as an extended form of Cultural History, but 
rather as a special form of Social History, has significant consequences. 
First of all, drawing upon the works of Bruno Latour and Michel Fou-
cault, it implies that researchers should not claim a priori that all hu-
mans and animals are actors or even subjects. Rather, they should re-
construct certain humans and animals and their relations internal to 
specific social conditions, conceiving of the social less as something 
structural and more as something situative. Second, drawing upon to the 
works of Judith Butler or Karen Barad, it implies that the status of hu-
mans and animals should not be seen as being all too stable. Rather, they 
should be viewed in the context of their ongoing materialization and 
with regard to their changing relations with other humans, other ani-
mals or other beings. The manifold differences between humans and 
animals – or among humans and animals themselves – should thus not 
only be understood as historically constructed, but as historically consti-
tuted or, better, co-constituted.  
But falling back on the concept of the social in this way does not nec-
essarily mean that Animal History must place exclusive focus on human-
animal relations, as doing so quickly leads one to conceive of humans 
and animals themselves as ontologically given.35 In this sense, research-
ing practices internal to human-animal relations is not the same as re-
constructing humans and animals as effects of such practices – not in an 
ontological but in an ontogenetic sense. Exclusive focus on human-
animal relations also easily leaves aside the fact that many humans have 
existed primarily in relation to other humans or to things and neither to 
animals nor to plants. This, in turn, makes it difficult to precisely formu-
late the ways in which human-animal relations have also influenced 
other relations humans sustain with other beings. It makes it thus diffi-
cult to understand the effects of human-animal relations outside the 
bounds of Animal History.36   
For these reasons, this paper has paid less attention to the various 
forms of interdependence and reciprocity in human-animal relations 
which Donna Haraway has placed at the center of debate. Rather, the 
 
34  Here I follow Bruno Latour by placing the social at the beginning of every form of 
Social History. See also Patrick Joyce, What is the Social in Social History?, in: Past 
and Present 205 (2009), p. 175-210.  
35  This would of course work against the meaning Donna Haraway gives to the notion 
of relations. 
36  Animal History may lose its “freak-status” as soon as it makes this point clear. 
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genealogical perspective promoted here directs more effort to research-
ing how many humans and certain animals have often been subordi-
nated to astonishingly similar societal demands: for example, in the 
framework of industrialization or urbanization, in the context of the 
emotionalization or therapeutization of many humans and – ever more 
prevalent – certain animals, or against the background of various forms 
of bio-politics.37  
From a genealogical perspective there is no going beyond anthropo-
centrism. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that humans don’t 
only constitute themselves as humans by attempting to distinguish 
themselves in principle from animals. They also constitute themselves as 
humans by claiming to be distinguished from animals only in degrees – 
as an animal among other animals. The crucial question is thus not 
whether or not we can write anything other than an anthropology, but 
rather what sort of anthropology we want to write. Once again, taking 
recourse to the work of Bruno Latour, writing a “symmetrical anthro-
pology” would have serious consequences for Animal History. It would 
not only mean historicizing human-animal relations as being variable, 
but rather would also mean historicizing humans and animals them-
selves as products. This implies not only a specific understanding of em-
pirical work but also of political critique.38  
Summary and Outlook 
If Animal History is to change the way we think about history, it will not 
achieve this goal by simply viewing animals in the same way that his-
torical research mostly views humans. Rather, the way we do historical 
research on animals as well as humans will have to significantly differ 
from previous approaches. The work of historians will not be brought 
forward by simply including humans and animals as living beings in his-
torical accounts whilst more or less explicitly excluding other beings. 
The much criticized nature/culture dichotomy is not done away with by 
 
37  This can be seen when one considers vaccinations and antibiotics or the supervision 
of dietary needs and the psychologization of health – all with relation to humans, but 
also increasingly with relation to certain animals. 
38  I have the impression that within Gender Studies and Postcolonial Studies this impor-
tant question of political critique is much better and much more controversially dis-
cussed than within Animal History. Cf. for example the classical studies of Judith But-
ler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York 1990; 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence 
Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Chicago 1988, p. 271-
313. 
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simply attributing actor- or subject-status and a certain way of “think-
ing” or “feeling” to animals as well.  
Conceiving of Animal History as Body History means not taking 
agency or subjectivity for granted. It means to decenter not only humans 
but animals as well. Thus, a basic question could be: which discourses – 
which societal demands and tasks – does a body have to conform to in 
order to become ever anew an actor or even a subject? Placing the body 
and its ongoing materialization at the center of debate also means un-
derstanding Animal History as a special form of Social History. Thus, we 
could take the body and effects of practices as the basis for our concep-
tion of the social, rather than actors or even subjects. In this way, hu-
man-animal relations along with humans and animals themselves ap-
pear within an endless process of production. Only in this context does it 
become clear that differences between humans and animals are not only 
historically constructed, but also historically constituted, in different 
ways and again and again.39 
Pursuing Animal History as Body History also means posing political 
questions about societal hegemonies. But this does not mean that one 
should automatically see animals as victims and humans as victimizers. 
Rather, we could not only research what humans do with and make out 
of animals, but also what they do with and make out of themselves in the 
context of human-animal relations. One should thus take the “anthropo-
logical machine” very seriously, not only on the more limited level of 
representation, but on the broader level of production. Even if humans 
have historically been hegemonic within human-animal relations, a ge-
nealogical perspective primarily attempts to reconstruct the various 
ways humans and animals have been produced differently. However, 
such a reconstruction does not have the aim of weakening our capacity 
to politically criticize the production of animals, but rather of strength-
ening our capacity to historically problematize the production of hu-
mans as well: the societal demands made on each single body to be a 
very particular body with specific capacities and supposed or neglected 
rights.40  
Animal History opens up a new perspective on humans, not only a 
new perspective on animals. But this new perspective should not be 
greeted for the simple reason that it is new: in today’s cultural and social 
sciences as well as in psychology and neurology, “thinking” often re-
 
39  On the distinction between construction and constitution cf. for instance Butler, Bod-
ies that Matter. 
40  Thus, from the perspective of Body History as well, the question of animal rights has 
a close connection with that of human rights. See for instance Joanna Bourke, What 
It Means to Be Human. Reflections from 1791 to the Present, Berkeley 2011. 
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ceives less attention than does “feeling”, and it is in no way a coinci-
dence that one speaks today of an “animal turn” and of an “affective 
turn”.41 In both cases, the meaning of the body is stressed, be it in the 
form of the notion of embodied agency or that of the affected body. But 
in both cases, the body tends to be essentialized – intentionally or unin-
tentionally – rather than historicized. Body History should, however, be 
deployed in order to reject every manifestation of the nature/culture 
dichotomy in historical research.  
Animal History as Body History should thereby be understood less as 
an expanded form of Cultural History and more as a special form of     
Social History. Such a form of Social History aims less at following an 
emphatic “history from below” and more at developing a distant “his-
tory from outside”, to the extent that this is at all possible. In this sense, 
it does not take animals and humans nor actors and subjects as a point 
of departure, but rather makes bodies and their changing production 
into an object of historical investigation. 
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41  Cf. for example Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach Us about Politics, Durham 2014. 
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